Issue: Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, may the government retry defendants who were acquitted of some charges on factually related counts on which the jury failed to reach a verdict?
Background: F. Scott Yeager was prosecuted on multiple counts of insider trading, money laundering, conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. The jury acquitted Yeager of the conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud charges, but deadlocked on the insider trading and money laundering charges. Yeager argues that his retrial on the hung counts should be barred because when the jury acquitted him, it resolved in his favor an issue of ultimate fact that was common to both the acquitted and the hung counts.
Issue: When a defendant accidentally discharges a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking, is it still subject to a ten-year sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)?
Background: On November 10, 2004, Christopher Michael Dean robbed a bank while carrying a pistol. While Dean was behind the counter, quickly grabbing money from a drawer, he accidentally discharged his gun into his right hand. Dean argues that his conviction was erroneous because § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which enhances the sentence of a defendant who discharges a firearm, includes an intent element.
Issue: When a person uses a cell phone to buy drugs for personal use, which is a misdemeanor, can he also be charged with the separate crime of using a phone to facilitate the sale of drugs, which is a felony?
Background: On several occasions, Salman Khade Abuelhawa called a drug dealer to purchase a gram of cocaine. Federal agents intercepted these phone calls, arrested Abuelhawa, and charged him with a misdemeanor for purchasing drugs for personal use and a felony for using a phone to facilitate the sale of drugs. The defendant argues that it is unreasonable to transform a misdemeanor into a felony simply because the crime was facilitated through a cell phone, rather than face-to-face.
Issue: Does the Due Process Clause give a defendant the right to access a state’s biological evidence after he has been convicted?
Background: In 1994, William Osborne was convicted of assault and rape. While he did not match the victim’s description of the perpetrator, he was convicted because his DNA matched the DNA found in the condom that was used in the crime. However, the type of DNA used to match Osborne to the condom is found in one out of every six or seven African-Americans. Now Osborne wants access to the DNA so that he can use a more reliable DNA test to attempt to prove his innocence.
Issue: Can a defendant be convicted of “aggravated identity theft” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) when he used a false means of identification without knowing it belonged to another person?
Background: In 2000, Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, a Mexican citizen, used a fake social security number and resident alien card to work at a steel company in Illinois. These documents bore an assumed name and the social security and alien registration numbers did not belong to a real person. Six years later, Flores-Figueroa acquired new counterfeit cards, and this time the numbers belonged to a real person. Flores-Figueroa claims he was unaware of this.
Issue: Does a criminal defendant’s conviction need be automatically reversed when the court erroneously denied his preemptory challenge, which resulted in a challenged juror being seated?
Background: Michael Rivera was charged with two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years of incarceration. At the defendant’s trial, he raised a preemptory challenge to a juror being seated, but the trial court dismissed that challenge when it, sua sponte, raised a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky. The lower court agreed, but did not hold that this was reversible error.
Background: Brillon was charged with aggravated assault and he already had three prior felony convictions, so he was facing a life sentence. While he was awaiting trial, his public defender made several continuance motions and the case was delayed for various reasons. The case had been delayed for three years when it was finally brought to trial.
Holding: The Supreme Court upheld Brillon’s conviction. It followed the general rule that delays in a case are attributable to the defendant, not the attorney. Therefore, because the delays were not attributable to a state actor, the Vermont Supreme Court erred by reversing the Defendant’s conviction.
Background: The defendant, Randy Hayes, was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9), which prohibits anyone convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from possessing a firearm. In 1994, Hayes had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in West Virginia, but he argued that this did not qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under §922(g)(9). He argued that that §922(g)(9) requires a domestic relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, so the West Virginia indictment did not qualify because this was not an element under the West Virginia statute.
Holding: The Supreme Court held that, under the plain language of the statute, a domestic relationship is not a necessary element of a qualifying predicate offense. For this reason, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to uphold the defendant’s conviction.
Issue: When a defendant accidentally discharges a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking, is it still subject to a ten-year sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)?
Background: On November 10, 2004, Christopher Michael Dean robbed a bank while carrying a pistol. While Dean was behind the counter, quickly grabbing money from a drawer, he accidentally discharged his gun into his right hand. Dean argues that his conviction was erroneous because § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which enhances the sentence of a defendant who discharges a firearm, includes an intent element.
Issue: When a person uses a cell phone to buy drugs for personal use, which is a misdemeanor, can he also be charged with the separate crime of using a phone to facilitate the sale of drugs, which is a felony?
Background: On several occasions, Salman Khade Abuelhawa called a drug dealer to purchase a gram of cocaine. Federal agents intercepted these phone calls, arrested Abuelhawa, and charged him with a misdemeanor for purchasing drugs for personal use and a felony for using a phone to facilitate the sale of drugs. The defendant argues that it is unreasonable to transform a misdemeanor into a felony simply because the crime was facilitated through a cell phone, rather than face-to-face.
Issue: Does the Due Process Clause give a defendant the right to access a state’s biological evidence after he has been convicted?
Background: In 1994, William Osborne was convicted of assault and rape. While he did not match the victim’s description of the perpetrator, he was convicted because his DNA matched the DNA found in the condom that was used in the crime. However, the type of DNA used to match Osborne to the condom is found in one out of every six or seven African-Americans. Now Osborne wants access to the DNA so that he can use a more reliable DNA test to attempt to prove his innocence.
Issue: Does the Due Process Clause give a defendant the right to access a state’s biological evidence after he has been convicted?
Background: In 1994, William Osborne was convicted of assault and rape. While he did not match the victim’s description of the perpetrator, he was convicted because his DNA matched the DNA found in the condom that was used in the crime. However, the type of DNA used to match Osborne to the condom is found in one out of every six or seven African-Americans. Now Osborne wants access to the DNA so that he can use a more reliable DNA test to attempt to prove his innocence.
Issue: Can a defendant be convicted of “aggravated identity theft” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) when he used a false means of identification without knowing it belonged to another person?
Background: In 2000, Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, a Mexican citizen, used a fake social security number and resident alien card to work at a steel company in Illinois. These documents bore an assumed name and the social security and alien registration numbers did not belong to a real person. Six years later, Flores-Figueroa acquired new counterfeit cards, and this time the numbers belonged to a real person. Flores-Figueroa claims he was unaware of this.
Issue: Does a criminal defendant’s conviction need be automatically reversed when the court erroneously denied his preemptory challenge, which resulted in a challenged juror being seated?
Background: Michael Rivera was charged with two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years of incarceration. At the defendant’s trial, he raised a preemptory challenge to a juror being seated, but the trial court dismissed that challenge when it, sua sponte, raised a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky. The lower court agreed, but did not hold that this was reversible error.
Issue: Does Edwards v. Arizona, which bars police from initiating questioning with criminal suspects who have invoked their right to counsel, apply to an interrogation that takes place three years after the suspect has made his request?
In 2003, Michael Shatzer allegedly sexually abused his three-year-old son. When police tried to question Shatzer - who was already in jail for another offense - about the offense, he refused to give a statement, telling them that he did not want to talk without an attorney present. The case stalled until 2006, when police re-opened the case and questioned Shatzer. Now Shatzer is arguing that his interview responses should be suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona.
Issue: Whether, on federal habeas review, the evidence underlying the defendant’s conviction for sexual assault was clearly insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia.
Background: Fourteen years ago, Troy Brown was convicted of sexual assault. DNA evidence was the primary evidence in the case. The District Court reversed his conviction, finding that the DNA information was false and the additional evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt. The Nevada Attorney General is arguing that, under Jackson v. Virginia, a federal habeas court should not expand the record or consider non-record evidence to determine the reliability of the evidence at trial, so the lower courts should not have reversed the defendant’s conviction.
Background: The defendant faced a conviction of the Armed Career Criminals Act, which requires a fifteen year sentence when a defendant possesses a firearm after committing three violent felonies or serious drug offenses. One of the defendant’s past offenses was a state conviction for escape from prison, which occurred when the defendant failed to report to prison. The defendant argued that the conviction was not “violent.”
Holding: The escape conviction did not qualify as a “violent felony” because it did not involve physical force and was a relatively passive offense that did not involve conduct that presented a risk of physical injury to another.
Background: When the defendant, Bennie Herring, returned to a police impound lot to retrieve some personal possessions, an officer at the lot inquired to surrounding counties about whether Herring had any outstanding warrants. An officer in another county erroneously stated that his county had an outstanding warrant on Herring, so the officer at the lot stopped Herring, searched him, and found methamphetamines. Later, the officer learned that Herring actually did not have any outstanding warrants. At trial, Herring moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, arguing that the search was unlawful because there was no warrant.
Holding: The Court held that the evidence should not be excluded because the search stemmed from an isolated incident of negligence, rather than systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements. Here, the deterrent effect did not outweigh the substantial cost of letting a guilty and possibly dangerous defendant go free.
Background: Thomas Ice was convicted of burglary and sexual abuse when he entered a neighbor’s apartment and sexually abused one of their children. Ice was ultimately convicted on six offenses and Oregon law states that sentences imposed for multiple crimes must be concurrent, unless the offenses arose out of separate instances or resulted in separate harms. The judge found that the convictions arose out of separate instances and ordered consecutive sentences. But Ice argued that a sentence determination that results in a longer sentence must be based on a jury’s factual findings, not a judge’s.
Holding: The Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit states from allowing judges, not juries, to find the facts necessary to impose consecutive sentences.
Background: Cesar Sarausad, the defendant, drove the car in a drive-by shooting in which another passenger shot and killed a teenager. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder based on an accomplice-liability theory “in for a dime, in for a dollar.” The defendant argued that the court erred by allowing the prosecutor to use this theory, because it could have led the jury to convict him by finding that he had simply anticipated that an assault would occur.
Holding: The Ninth Circuit erred by granting habeas relief to the defendant because the state court decision did not result in an “unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” The state courts’ conclusion that the jury instruction was unambiguous had not been objectively unreasonable.
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